Abstract Risk analysis in the water utility sector is fast becoming explicit. Here, we describe application of a capability model to benchmark the risk analysis maturity of a sub-sample of eight water utilities from the USA, the UK and Australia. Our analysis codifies risk analysis practice and offers practical guidance as to how utilities may more effectively employ their portfolio of risk analysis techniques for optimal, credible, and defensible decision making.
Introduction
The provision of safe, reliable drinking water, the overarching goal of the international water utility sector (AWWA et al., 2001) , is arguably well within the bounds of the developed world's science, technology, and financial resources. Nevertheless, water quality related outbreaks remain depressingly prevalent (e.g. Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004) , with their causes ranging from technical failures through to lapses or even criminal negligence on the part of operating or managerial staff. Risk analysis can help prevent such failures through proactively identifying and assessing the mechanisms through which they may arise. This concept of preventing failure through understanding failure extends beyond the design and operation of a water supply system to encompass the full range of utility functions (e.g. from plant operations to strategic investment; Figure 1 .1). Indeed, the introduction of water safety plans, codes of good corporate governance and the debate on self-regulation are promoting a shift in the approach to risk analysis to one increasingly explicit and integrated with other business processes. Risk analysis now extends beyond its traditional preserve in occupational health and safety and public health protection to embrace corporate level decision making, asset management (Booth & Rogers 2001; Lifton & Smeaton 2003) , watershed protection (IMPRESS Management 2002; WHO 2003; Lloyd & Abell 2005) and network reliability (Stahl & Elliott 1999; Stevens & Lloyd 2004) . When supported by initiation criteria and formal procedures, using personnel with appropriate skills, experience, and resources, risk analysis can provide utilities with benefits ranging from an improved understanding of treatment reliability to an explicit appreciation of • Political/regulatory risks project financial risks (MacGillivray et al., 2006a) . Applied inappropriately, whether due to ill-defined procedures or deficient institutional capacities, risk analysis is not a subset of risk management but its panacea.
As such, a reasonable research question is: how can we assess and improve organisational competencies in risk analysis? In this paper, we report on the application of a maturity model to benchmark risk management within the international water utility sector, focussing on the findings relating to risk analysis.
Research scope
Before proceeding, it is necessary to explain what we mean by risk analysis and risk management. Risk is widely accepted to consist of a combination of probabilities and consequences. A more pragmatic approach is to consider risk as the potential for deviation from desired outcomes (e.g. business objectives, design intentions). We consider risk management to be a series of processes for identifying, evaluating and responding to these uncertainties. Risk analysis involves the identification and assessment of risk. Given the varying contexts within which risk analysis is applied, we view the juxtaposition of both the technical and managerial aspects of the prior art as central to providing a well-rounded examination of its application within the sector.
Methods -risk management capability maturity model
Capability maturity models (Paulk et al., 1993) codify industry practice so distinctions can be made between organisations and improvements made. Our risk management capability maturity model (MacGillivray et al., 2006b ) adopts five levels of maturity, from "learner" to "best practice." Its design has drawn on wide-ranging literature reviews, structured interviews with utility managers and prior knowledge of maturity modelling in similar utility sectors. The model includes, in part, an evaluation of the extent to which risk analysis, as one feature of an organisation's capability to manage risk, is defined and controlled as a process. Attributes describing the maturity of any process within risk management, including risk analysis, and the specific descriptions of maturity levels 3 (L3) and 4 (L4), as they refer to risk analysis, are in 
Results and discussion -observed risk analysis practices
We have applied the risk management capability maturity model to the water sector in the US, the UK Canada and Australia and, for a sub-sample of eight utilities providing high quality data, have captured common, good and best practice in risk analysis. Benchmarking comprised three components: self-assessment by questionnaire; semi-structured interviews; and document analysis. With respect to risk analysis, contributors to this sub-sample were described as being at either L3 or L4, though we do not suggest this reflects risk management capability for the sector as a whole. A key finding of our research is that risk analysis is not best viewed as an overarching process, but rather as a series of discrete processes within which distinct analysis methodologies are applied, which themselves reside within organisational functions. We therefore discuss our observations on a function-specific basis.
Process engineering
A prerequisite for process definition (L3) is that the application of risk analysis techniques is guided by formalised procedures -a practice intended to ensure the consistency and rigour of analysis. We observed this within process engineering in one utility, where a technical guideline had recently been devised for the application of hazard and operability studies (HAZOP). HAZOP systematically evaluates the process and engineering intentions of new or existing facilities in order to identify the hazards that may arise due to deviations from design specifications (American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1992). Typically, a carefully selected team examines a process (e.g. disinfection) subdivided into "nodes," at each node, the team applies guidewords (e.g. low) to process parameters (e.g. ozone levels) to identify ways in which the process may deviate from its design intention, before evaluating the causes and consequences of the deviation. The logic of process definition is that specifying the stages in the design process for the application of HAZOP, proceduralising the tasks and activities central to its execution, and providing staff with the requisite expertise (e.g. through workshops), creates a process infrastructure that supports its execution beyond the tenure of experienced staff. This is particularly important in an industry characterised by regular restructuring and high levels of staff turnover.
Business planning
We now turn to discuss the strategic approach to risk analysis which focuses on "business risks", i.e. those primarily non-technical risks with the potential for causing deviation from high-level business objectives. Within one utility, we observed this to be proceduralised within the second of two business planning workshops. The first addressed the market and competitor environment, including: social, technological, environmental, economic and political (STEEP) analysis; strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis; strategic objectives; and strategic options. From this, the "strategic direction" was set for each business area, which served as the initiation point for the risk analysis workshop. Here, the outputs of the previous workshop, allied with brainstorming and knowledge of historic risk analyses, informed the identification of risks to achieving business objectives (e.g. in finance: impact of adoption of International Accounting Standards). A qualitative risk ranking matrix was then applied to assess their potential impact and likelihood of occurrence.
However, in common with the remainder of our sub-sample, this strategic risk analysis tended to rely more upon expert judgement rather than being underpinned by extensive data analysis. One manager opined that as their strategic risk portfolio tended to evolve over time and with the perceptions of management, a predefined strategy of data collection to support its analysis was not pragmatic. As such, the role of internal audit and the risk management group in facilitating and providing quality assurance (L4) of these workshops, observed within one utility, is critical to ensuring that strategic risk analysis provides utilities with an improved understanding of the risks that they are seeking to manage, rather than simply being an exercise in fortune telling blindly undertaken to satisfy corporate governance regulations. In another utility, quality assurance had historically encompassed the use of a "professional support group" -comprised of experts drawn from multiple disciplines (e.g. legal, insurance, finance, environmental and quality, health and safety) who were independent of the risk analysis process -to peer review the strategic risk analysis.
Asset management
Balancing risk and resources has long been an implicit component of asset management, and is becoming increasingly explicit owing to growing pressures for utilities to exhibit financial self-sufficiency, meaning that they can no longer seek to over-engineer facilities with the presumption of screening out technical risk (MacGillivray et al., 2006a) . A risk-based approach to asset management requires an integrated, systematic process drawing upon a broad range of methodologies for the identification, analysis and prioritisation of assets-atrisk, from the process to the component level (e.g. Booth and Rogers, 2001 ). Within one utility we observed the undertaking of failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) studies across their water supply systems. FMECA is an engineering technique that tabulates failure modes of equipment and their effects on a system (American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1992). The failure mode describes how equipment fails (open, closed, on, off, leaks, etc.); failure effect is determined by the system's response to the equipment failure. Its application allows the utility to identify and prioritise risks across their asset portfolio (e.g. various mains, raw and treated reservoirs, treatment works etc.), enabling them to focus attention on the most serious threats to system performance. We observed that their procedures for undertaking and updating FMECA studies were initiated on a cyclical basis. The interviewee highlighted the value of this requirement, noting that prior to its introduction, supported by a central asset risk register, risk analyses were not regularly updated, instead being performed for a specific purpose at decision making points.
We further observed mechanisms for ensuring procedural compliance and proving quality assurance of risk analysis in recognition of its central role in shaping capital investment programmes. This was driven by a desire to ensure consistency in application and to correct for analyst bias. Within one utility, whilst "experts in the field" regarding asset condition principally undertook the analysis, this was supported by a programme of facilitated workshops to ensure consistency. Additionally, the administrator of the asset database conducted spot check audits and was further responsible for the ongoing moderation of analysis outputs.
Drinking water quality management
The revised WHO guidelines (WHO, 2003) are promoting the implementation of water safety plans for water quality management from catchment management, through treatment, distribution and on to the tap. Central to this is the hazard analysis and critical control points (HACCP) methodology, namely the determination of "critical control points" whereupon risks can be monitored and reduced (Codex Alimentarius, 1993; Hellier, 2000) . We observed the implementation of this approach within our sub-sample. In one utility, the process begins with the division of the water system into subsystems (e.g. catchment, treatment, distribution, etc.). Across each subsystem (e.g. catchment) hazard types (e.g. physical: turbidity and colour) and their associated causes (e.g. erosion) and driving events (e.g. landslip, storm) are identified and rated via a qualitative risk ranking matrix. Those deemed most significant were evaluated further for their critical control points (operational parameters describing the effectiveness of control measures designed to mitigate water quality hazards, e.g. ph residuals at and post disinfection). Assessors then identified the critical limits (e.g. 2000 cells/mL of cyanobacteria for taste and odour related hazards), monitoring programmes and corrective actions for each CCP.
We now highlight the subtle distinction between verification, which seeks to evaluate whether the process has been followed correctly, and validation (L4), which is concerned with whether the process itself is correct (e.g. validating the risk analysis methodologies). Both of these aspects were enshrined in one utility's application of a "common sense screen" at the end of their HACCP-based process. Here, if analysis outputs appeared at odds with experienced operational knowledge, the reason behind the "false" score was investigated, and either the process and score adapted where appropriate.
The practical lessons
So what does this mean for utility managers? How can they assess their current maturity in risk analysis and identify practical steps to improve? Given that risk analysis is best treated as a function specific, not overarching discipline, we suggest that they gather representatives from their various functional areas and ask them "the four questions."
What methodologies do you apply to identify and assess risks?
A self-explanatory question, but care should be taken to delve deeply, as the authors have experience of utility engineers viewing risk analysis methodologies as something that "the corporates" apply, neglecting to consider their own use of HAZOP.
Have you defined how these methodologies are applied and supported?
Specifically, this seeks to determine whether: initiation criteria are formalised; procedures exist detailing how the methodologies are to be applied; and whether the requisite resources (e.g. data inputs, skills) are predefined and available. As we have noted, this creates a process infrastructure which ensures consistency and stability of execution.
Do you verify that risk analysis is undertaken, and undertaken correctly?
This seeks to establish whether risk analysis is controlled as a process. Ensuring that risk analysis is undertaken as required can be attained through, for example, supervisory "sign off" of completed assessments. Ensuring that risk analysis is undertaken properly (i.e. quality assurance) may be achieved through peer reviews. Where HAZOP is applied, for example, questions for the reviewers to pose may include: did the analysts work their way through the HAZOP study systematically, or did they overlook important scenarios, components and process flows; were all stages and operating modes of the process considered (e.g. start-up, shutdown and transitioning to partial operation); and was adequate time spent on the analysis.
Do you know whether your risk analysis process is valid?
In our experience, this is the most difficult question to answer. Regardless, managers should not shy away from examining whether, for example, the application of HACCP within drinking water quality management constitutes good practice, or if recourse to quantitative methodologies is justified. Validation appears a weakness of the sector, and managers should not be distracted by justifications as to why staff think that their process is valid, but instead focus on whether objective evidence exists. Methods for validation include external audits, benchmarking, or statistical techniques in the case of quantitative methodologies.
Conclusions
Our benchmarking results provide utility managers, chief finance officers and regulatory officials with valuable insights into the developing risk management culture within water utilities and a systematic understanding of good risk analysis practice. Of course, there is a trade off between the investments required to become leading-edge in risk analysis and the benefits to be obtained. Risk analysis remains a largely expert discipline, and many organisations are more comfortable with their historic implicit approaches. However, this does not absolve them of their obligation to understand how mature their risk analysis processes are, and how they may be improved. Only then can the cost-benefit implications of progression up the maturity scale be evaluated.
